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ABSTRACT 
 This paper explores the contrast of China’s spectacular economic development 
and the low scores of trust for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy among 
the Chinese people.  The sharp contrast may reflect flaws in the shaping of de facto 
authority of the Chinese government.  The de facto authority is examined in connection 
to the notion of the Mandate of Heaven from the Confucian tradition.  The severe 
imbalance of economic growth and lack of political reform is discussed against the 
backgrounds of the domestic and international political circumstances.  This paper argues 
that, in spite of the phenomenal economic development of the past three decades, the 
Chinese people’s mixed feelings about the legitimacy of the Chinese authorities may be 
rooted in the combination of the rescued Mandate of Heaven through economic growth 
and the CCP’s flawed legitimacy based on de facto authority.  
Thesis Mentor:______________________ 
Dr. Pidi Zhang 
 
Honors Director: _____________________ 
Dr. Steven Engel 
November 2015 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology 
University Honors Program 
Georgia Southern University 
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
Perhaps, the most important lesson in sociology is that you are never alone.  My 
successes are the success of others as much as they are mine.  I like to think of this thesis 
as an accomplishment.  As such, I am indebted to those who have made this thesis 
possible.  Thank you all for OUR success: 
 
First and foremost, Dr. Pidi Zhang contributed immeasurably to this work; he has been an 
inspiration to me and he has done more for me than he knows-Thank you, Dr. Zhang. 
 
Vicky, you are the most loving and kind person that I have ever known and the best sister 
that there could ever be.  AND, WE’LL ALWAYS BE BEST FRIENDS FOREVER 
AND EVER… 
 
Momma and Daddy, you’ve always supported me even when you didn’t understand.  
You are strength and you are love.  A daughter could ask for nothing better in her parents.  
Thank you.  I love you both! 
 
Walter, through all of this, you have been my anchor. But, most importantly you have 
taught me to love and to be loved in return.  No greater gift could ever be given.  I love 
you! 
 
Walter Jones, Sr. and Linda Jones, you have always accepted me into your family and I 
cannot thank you enough for all that you have done. 
 
Emily and Nathan, we have had our battles, but the two of you have always been loyal.  
You have been there in the good times and the bad.  If that isn’t friendship, then I don’t 
know what is.  I love you both. 
 
Dr. Steven Engel, Dr. Francis Desiderio, Erin Martin, and Linda Rushing are the most 
caring and compassionate Honors staff.  Dr. Heidi Altman has been extraordinarily 
helpful through her editorial comments, her advice, and her willingness to listen to my 
ideas for this project.  Thank you all for making this an experience of a lifetime!   
 
Finally, to those who have guided this journey, but could not see me finish here on Earth: 
For my angels in Heaven, Granny, Pa, Grandma Pat, Shaneen, and Caterina.   
3 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements         2 
 
Introduction           4 
 China’s Early Modernization Efforts in a Nutshell      4 
 Domestic and International Politico-Economic Structure   6 
China’s Imbalanced Modernization and Unconvinced Legitimacy  9 
 
Methods          12 
 
Findings          13 
 
 Economic Growth        13 
  Figure 1. China’s GDP 1980 to 2013 (current US$)   15 
  Figure 2. FDI (foreign direct investment to China from 1980 
  to 2013        15 
  Table 1.GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, and FDI  
  from 1980 to 2013       16 
 
 Urbanization and Employment      17 
Figure 3. Agriculture Employment, Rural Population,  
Urban Population, and Unemployment (% of total population) 17 
 
 Life Expectancy, Prenatal Care and Infant Mortality    17 
  Table 2. Life Expectancy, Prenatal Care and Infant Mortality 18 
 
 Poverty Rates and Distribution of Income     19 
Table 3. Poverty Rates and Distribution of Income among  
Five Quintiles        20 
 
 Domestic Perceptions of the CCP and Its Political Legitimacy  20 
  Table 4. People’s Tribune Survey of Confidence,  
  Conviction and Faith, 2013      23 
 
Discussion          24 
 
Conclusion          27 
 
References          30 
 
  
4 
 
Introduction 
 Since the economic reform of the late 1970s, China has been one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world. From 1979 to 2013, China’s real gross domestic 
product (GDP) increased at an average rate of about 10%. Compared with the growth rate 
of 4.4% from 1953 to 1978, the highest growth rate of 14.2% seems staggering. The 
global economic crisis that hit in 2008 dealt a blow to the rapid growth trajectory. GDP 
grew 7.7% in 2012 and 2013 and it was expected to grow 7.4% in 2014 (Morrison, 2014). 
After three decades of rapid growth, the Chinese economy is now getting into a period of 
what is called a “New Normal” of lowered economic growth (Xi, 2015). China’s 
economic surge in the last few decades has brought prosperity, but its modernization is 
imbalanced. This paper explores China’s recent experiences of modernization, and how 
China’s unique modernization experiences affects the legitimacy of the Chinese 
government among its people and on an international stage. 
China’s Early Modernization Efforts in a Nutshell 
Efforts toward modernization in China started in the nineteenth century.  Early 
attempts by activists toward the end of Qing Dynasty involved adopting the functions of 
Western modernity while preserving the essence of Chinese tradition (Rosker, 2014). The 
efforts to modernize within the framework of royal power failed because of a lack of 
coherence, a lack of continuity, and because of a disconnect between sources of 
knowledge in the West and in China (Bergere1994; Rosker 2014).1 Sun Yat-sen used the 
Nationalist rhetoric and led a series of painstaking endeavors in the Nationalist movement 
                                                 
1 The modernization efforts since the late nineteenth century are beyond the concerns of this paper. They 
provide a background for the more recent modernization efforts. 
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that overthrew the Qing Dynasty, which was perceived “foreign” because it was 
originally a non-Han nomad nation to the northeast of China that had destroyed the Han-
Chinese Ming Dynasty. Sun Yat-sen became the founding interim president of the 
Nationalist republic government but soon had to give up that position.   
Nevertheless, Sun Yat-sen developed the “Three Principles of the People” as a 
form of political guidelines for nation-building and “The International Development of 
China” as his envisioned economic modernization blueprints (Bergere, 1994). The 
Nationalist government headed by Jiang Kai-shek, which bore the frontal resistance to 
Japanese invasion during the Second World War, was substantially weakened at the end 
of the War. During the brief period between the end of Second World War and the Civil 
War, the Communists applied various rhetorical strategies in the struggles with the 
Nationalists for political power. They accused the Nationalist government of suppressing 
democracy and exercising military autocracy. Mao Zedong claimed that the Communists 
were fighting for a democratic society, a feat commensurate to what Washington and 
Lincoln did in the United States. The Communists were able to gain cooperation and 
support from other small political parties in China. The Nationalists, who appeared to be 
(temporarily) totalitarian, were deeply frustrated by the suspicion from Western countries 
(Deng 2014). Substantially weakened during the Second World War, the Nationalists 
were losing the Chinese Civil War that broke out after the Second World War to the 
Communists even with the various sources of aid from the United States.   
After the Communists defeated the Nationalists, they did not establish a 
democracy. In the eyes of Western scholars, “China did not pursue the ideal of ‘progress’ 
in the Western sense” and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was perceived as a new 
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dynasty under the control of the CCP that failed to establish a modern Western-style 
democracy (Kissinger, 2012, p.96).  The first three decades of the PRC was punctuated 
with political movements.  Mao started them in rapid succession to consolidate the power 
of the CCP in China. Meanwhile, Mao obtained absolute control by building up his own 
charisma in the nation and in the Party. Economic development was brought to the top 
priority occasionally during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), which was supposedly 
an initiative directed towards an economic feat; the movement, however, had a strong 
color of a political campaign. It was based more on ideological fervor about the 
superiority of socialism over capitalism than on sound economic policy. In 1966, a few 
years after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution 
in order to purge those who advocated economic growth over class struggles.  The 
movement brought the Chinese economy to the brink of collapse (Kissinger, 2012). The 
shift from the revolutionary rhetoric to economic reform did not occur until the late 1970s. 
The first Chinese leader in the post-Mao era began to implement Sun Yat-sen’s 
modernization plans (Bergere, 1994) 
Domestic and International Politico-Economic Structure 
China’s experiences of modernization in recent decades occurred when domestic, 
economic and political situations demanded a change of policy directions. This period 
was also characterized by a major shift in the international geopolitical dynamic.  The 
Cold War had lasted four decades after the Second World War. Within the Communist 
camp, China was faced with increasing pressure and threat from the Soviet Union.  
Overall, China was in need of a way out of the conundrum of having two stronger 
adversaries who were adversaries to each other. US National Security Advisor Henry 
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Kissinger’s secret visit to China in 1971 paved the way for U.S. President Richard 
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Kissinger (2012) addressed the importance of necessary 
conditions for historical events to occur and discussed the significance of craft and 
agency of statesmanship and the critical timeliness of decision making and policy 
implementation: 
“Leaders cannot create the context in which they operate. Their distinctive 
contribution consists in operating at the limit of what the given situation permits. 
If they exceed these limits, they crash; if they fall short of what is necessary, their 
policies stagnate. If they build soundly, they may create a new set of relationships 
that sustains itself over a historical period because all parties consider it in their 
own interest. (p. 215)” 
 
Kissinger’s remarks are not restricted to extolling the historically significant feats 
wrought by American and Chinese leaders of the day. They can be used to make sense of 
failures of early efforts toward modernization in China. For example, Sun Yat-sen was 
not able to create the context in which he operated. In hindsight, his “Three Principles of 
the People” and “The International Development of China” displayed profound foresight, 
but these desires unfortunately exceeded the limits of his era and his efforts crashed 
(Bergere, 1994). Nonetheless, his visions were to be put to practice when the domestic 
and international circumstances became ripe toward the end of the 1970s. 
The rapid rapprochement after over twenty years of hostility between the United 
States and China benefited both countries, as it significantly alleviated the pressure of 
both countries from the difficulties in their respective relationships with the Soviet Union. 
The Shanghai Communiqué forged an alliance in which each side committed itself to 
avoiding hegemonic intentions in the Asia-Pacific region while voicing their opposition 
against further Soviet expansion (Kissinger, 2012).  As further evolvements demonstrated, 
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the rapprochement not only improved the geopolitical situations for both countries, it 
served as the initial political preparations for the economic benefit both countries were to 
receive in the decades that followed.  
The rapprochement opened opportunities for US capital to tap low-cost resources 
in China. In the mid-1970s the economies of war-torn European and Asian countries 
resumed production of goods for export and became competitors with the United States.  
American corporations were faced with declining profit rates. The US business sector 
supported policies that would reduce the power of organized labor, reduce government 
regulations on U.S. businesses, and reverse a declining work ethic among American 
workers. One important response of the corporate leaders was to embark on a forty-year 
program of increased foreign investment, mergers and joint ventures with foreign 
corporations while outsourcing and offshoring domestic production. (Wysong, Perrucci 
& Wright, 2014). The increasing imperative for American and other Western sources of 
capital to look overseas, particularly in less-tapped countries, for cheap labor and other 
resources coincided with the emerging needs for direct foreign investment in China.  This 
international structure facilitated the creation of an economic partnership that 
complimented the political partnership that was established at the end of the Cold War. 
The rapprochement also brought unprecedented economic opportunities for China. 
After Mao’s death in 1976, China broke away from the Maoist variant of the classical 
Stalinist model.  Economic development then became a national priority. The switch 
became practical when the relation with the United States was beginning to normalize. A 
favorable international environment made it possible to consider implementing policies 
similar to “The International Development of China” proposed by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 
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(Bergere, 1994). One essential factor made the changes not only possible, but also 
effective.  The timing of the making and implementation of government policies at the 
moment the external conditions were ripe and most favorable was essential to China’s 
economic development (Kissinger, 2012). The Chinese government seized the 
opportunity to implement a series of new economic policies with a clear orientation 
toward a market economy. Although the needs for rapprochement by both the United 
States and China were initially motivated by geopolitical considerations, the 
normalization of relations paved the way to economic cooperation that was to follow 
almost immediately. Early economic policy changes occurred in the fields of agriculture 
and external economic relations (Ellman, 1986).  China’s economic modernization was 
beginning to set into a rapid track in late 1970s. 
China’s Imbalanced Modernization and Unconvinced Legitimacy 
Modernization theory has numerous sources. It addresses not only tradition versus 
modernity in terms of conceptual schemes such as the rationality, individualism, activism, 
and bureaucratization, but it also deals with empirically testable propositions about GDP 
per capita or life expectancy and the related economic, social, political and personality 
structures of a society. Since industrialization was seen as the driving force of 
modernization, GDP per capita has been commonly used as a measure (Marsh, 2014). 
Early modernization theory has been criticized for taking modernization as 
Westernization. The Western conception of democracy became a dominant global 
ideology (Torfason and Ingram, 2010). It has been widely recognized later that the core 
processes of modernization – industrialization, urbanization, technology, structural 
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differentiation, bureaucratic rationality – are not inherently Western as demonstrated by 
the experiences of Japan and other Asian societies (Marsh, 2014).  
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping raised the idea of Four Modernizations for China, namely 
the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense 
(Marsh, 2014). In a tone similar to the modernization efforts in the nineteenth century, 
under Deng Xiaoping’s policies, China “adopted what is useful in Western modernization 
theory and discarded its unfit components,” and formed “a modernization outlook with 
Chinese characteristics” (Cao, 2009, p. 10-11). It should be noted that the livelihood of 
the people was the most important of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People 
(nationalism, democracy and the livelihood of the people) (Bergere, 1994). It is not 
surprising that the Four Modernizations have a clear focus on industrialization and the 
economy. However, it may appear unacceptable that political modernization or the 
globally accepted ideology of democracy is not even mentioned in the Four 
Modernizations.  Critics pointed out that a fifth modernization – democracy is needed in 
order for China’s modernization project to be complete. 
The primordial importance of the livelihood of the people may be found 
throughout Chinese history. Wasserstrom (2010) discusses the repeated Chinese dynastic 
cycles that transfer the Mandate of Heaven from a regime less mindful of the people’s 
need to a more virtuous and deserving one. He suggests that, like previous dynasties, the 
Nationalists lost the Mandate of Heaven as the last power turnover in Chinese history.  
Nuyen (2013) explores the concept in the contextual era of 2,000 years ago without 
imposing anything additional on what the concept originally meant.  Mencius, the most 
important Confucian beside Confucius himself, would allow for a popular revolt against a 
11 
 
despotic ruler although he would consider it inappropriate to claim that ordinary people 
know Heaven’s will.  If a corrupt regime is replaced by a new one, the latter presumably 
assumes a certain level of political legitimacy.  Even if Heaven does not speak, later on 
“political legitimacy (illegitimacy) is confirmed as the consequence of seeing that the 
people are prospering (suffering)” (Nuyen, 2013, p. 122).  According to Confucius, or 
Mencius more specifically, the ideal society is one in which the Emperor rules with the 
Mandate and provides the order under which the people are able to make a prosperous 
living.  In this sense, the Nationalists were unfortunate to preside over a distressed war-
torn and semi-colonized society. Probably not entirely by their own fault, they lost the 
Mandate of the Heaven which was passed to the Communists, who, similar to leaders of 
many rebellions in Chinese history, seized power and assumed de facto authority as a 
result of military victories. The Mandate of Heaven may be tacitly passed from the 
Nationalists to the Communists as a de facto transfer of political control and authority. To 
prove the regime established by the Communists has been granted the Mandate of the 
Heaven, they must enable the Chinese people to live a prosperous life. 
The Communists did not prove their worthiness of the Mandate of Heaven after 
they seized power as they spent the first few decades on stabilizing control of the society. 
Mao “sought radical and instant transformation and a total break with the past” 
(Kissinger, 2012, p.94).  This strategy, however, ironically solidified his position on top 
of the traditional Confucian-style institutions through the rhetoric of continuous 
revolution (Kissinger, 2012).  Mao’s excessive reliance on political movements failed to 
provide an order to allow the people a prosperous life. The legitimacy that came as a de 
facto authority when the Communists took control of the country from the Nationalists 
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was being squandered. However, the successful execution of the Four Modernizations 
since the late 1970s has improved the standard of living, created a growing middle class, 
and drastically reduced poverty in China. This paper argues that the economic 
achievement during the past three decades came to the rescue of the Communist 
government from completely losing the Mandate of the Heaven. The rapid increase of the 
gap between the rich and poor may be a threat to the government’s legitimacy. In 
addition, although the modernization project without a political component has brought 
the Chinese people with prosperity, it keeps pestering the Communist Party of China with 
its unconvinced legitimacy. Such a dubious legitimacy should manifest itself in the level 
of people’s support to the Party. Meanwhile it should serve as a pushing force toward 
political reform in China2.  
Methods 
China’s recent modernization efforts started in the late 1970s. World Bank has 
published relatively more complete data about China’s economic performance since 1980.  
Aggregate data about China between 1980 and 2013 published by World Bank are used 
to illustrate the economic modernization of the country in the past three decades. The 
measures include gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), agricultural and nonagricultural employment as a 
percentage of total employment, rural population and urban population as a percentage of 
total population.  Data from World Bank also provide measures of the quality of life of 
Chinese people such as the percentage of poverty at $1.25 a day based on purchase power 
                                                 
2 Through the course of this study, it has come to light that the CCP is implementing what it calls the Fifth 
Modernization (modernization of the national governance system and governing ability) which is beginning 
to emphasize the rule of law but avoids mentioning democracy in the Western sense. 
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parity (PPP), total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and income shared by the 
five population quintiles as a percentage of GDP.   
Legitimacy is measured by four proxy variables obtained from a public survey 
conducted in China by the online People’s Tribune, a subsidiary of the official People’s 
Daily in China. The survey asked the following questions: 1. “Do you agree that CCP has 
sufficient courage and wisdom to speed up reform?” 2. “Do you agree with the statement 
that ‘sticking to the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is beneficial to 
the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of people’?” 3. “Do you agree with the 
statement that ‘it is only the CCP that is able to lead the people well down the route of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics’?” and 4. “How do you take on the system of 
‘ruled by one party (CCP) and participated by many’ practiced in China?” The survey 
result was published synchronically online as participants submitted their answers. 
Findings 
Economic Growth  
 Figures 1 and 2 report China’s GDP and Foreign Direct Investment between 1980 
and 2013.  China’s GDP in 1980 was $189.4 billon. In 2013 it was $9.24 trillion, an 
increase of 48.8 times. In 1980 Deng Xiaoping expected that Chinese economy would 
“double two times” from 1981 by the end of the twentieth century, which would require 
an average annual growth of 7.2%. Many took that as a bold unrealistic prospect because 
that level of growth would only be sustained during a period restoring from a war or 
natural disaster. Using Chinese data Lin found that China’s annual economic growth was 
9.7% between 1978 and 2007 (Lin, 2014). Data from World Bank (Table 1) shows that 
the annual GDP growth rate reached two digits at 10.9% in 1983.  During the thirty-four 
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years from 1980 and 2013 there were fifteen years in which annual growth reached or 
exceeded 10%, with an average of 9.86%. As the base sizes of earlier years’ GDPs were 
small, the net increases were also small. For instance, the growth rate of 10.9% converted 
to a per capita GDP increase from $201.4 of 1982 to $223.3 of 1983, a net increase of 
only $20.90.  As the GDP base sizes kept increasing, the net increases became much 
larger as shown in Figure 1. 
Growth slowed between 1989 and 1991 after the Beijing Massacre of June 1989. 
Those were the few years the new leader, Jiang Zemin as established by Deng Xiaoping, 
displayed uncertainty about further economic reform. Deng Xiaoping's speeches during 
his Southern Tour in 1992 reiterated the necessity for continued economic reform. The 
same year, GDP growth rate surged a 14.2% and remained at two digits for five years. In 
the period between 1997 and 2002, GDP grew at rates between 7.6% and 9.3%. From 
2003 the growth rate reached two digits again and plateaued for a few years until it 
peaked again at 14.2% in 2007.  Growth rate dropped dramatically to 9.6% in 2008, the 
year the world-wide recession broke out, which no doubt stunted the dramatic growth that 
China experienced from 1999 to 2007.  Furthermore, it is noteworthy that GDP growth 
rates persisted at the above 9.2% level for the next few years, until they dropped to 7.7% 
since 2012.  
Table 1 also shows foreign direct investment. World Bank data indicate that the 
FDI in China in 1982 was only $430 million. FDI increased slowly but steadily until 
1991. It should be noted that the Tiananmen Square massacre did not seem to affect FDI.  
Similar to the performance of GDP growth, after Deng Xiaoping’s reassurance of 
continued economic reform in early 1992, FDI experienced a sharp hike that year to 
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$11.16 billion. Then, there was another steady increase of FDI until 2004, which was 
followed by a second hike in 2005 to $111.21 billion. Since then FDI has been in a third 
period of steady increase. The high correlation between FDI and GDP does not warrant 
speculation of causal relations but it is strong indication that increasing FDI contributed 
to the growth of GDP.  
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Table 1. GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP Growth Rate and FDI from 1980 to 2013 
Year GDP (current US$) 
GDP Per Capita 
(current US$) 
GDP Growth 
(Annual %) 
FDI (foreign direct 
investment, current 
US$) 
1980 189,400,991,348.90 193.0 7.8 
 1981 194,109,567,421.60 195.3 5.2 
 1982 203,181,343,416.90 201.4 9.1 430,000,000 
1983 228,454,092,247.40 223.3 10.9 636,000,000 
1984 257,430,422,884.00 248.3 15.2 1,258,000,000 
1985 306,667,904,949.80 291.8 13.5 1,659,000,000 
1986 297,831,277,506.80 279.2 8.8 1,875,000,000 
1987 270,372,534,122.40 249.4 11.6 2,314,000,000 
1988 309,523,098,698.40 281.0 11.3 3,194,000,000 
1989 343,974,067,007.60 307.5 4.1 3,393,000,000 
1990 356,937,329,023.30 314.4 3.8 3,487,000,000 
1991 379,468,645,984.90 329.7 9.2 4,366,000,000 
1992 422,660,548,425.40 362.8 14.2 11,156,000,000 
1993 440,501,207,081.70 373.8 14.0 27,515,000,000 
1994 559,224,201,926.10 469.2 13.1 33,787,000,000 
1995 728,007,549,739.40 604.2 10.9 35,849,200,000 
1996 856,084,628,929.80 703.1 10.0 40,180,000,000 
1997 952,653,115,236.50 774.5 9.3 44,237,000,000 
1998 1,019,461,964,545.90 820.9 7.8 43,751,000,000 
1999 1,083,278,591,739.60 864.7 7.6 38,753,000,000 
2000 1,198,474,937,919.30 949.2 8.4 38,399,300,000 
2001 1,324,806,909,018.30 1041.6 8.3 44,241,000,000 
2002 1,453,827,558,024.40 1135.4 9.1 49,307,976,629 
2003 1,640,958,734,587.30 1273.6 10.0 49,456,847,102 
2004 1,931,644,329,934.30 1490.4 10.1 62,108,043,001 
2005 2,256,902,590,825.30 1731.1 11.3 111,210,225,749 
2006 2,712,950,885,444.10 2069.3 12.7 133,272,548,472 
2007 3,494,055,942,162.30 2651.3 14.2 169,389,842,758 
2008 4,521,827,271,025.60 3413.6 9.6 186,797,550,544 
2009 4,990,233,518,751.70 3748.5 9.2 167,070,808,699 
2010 5,930,502,270,313.00 4433.3 10.4 272,986,562,273 
2011 7,321,891,954,608.10 5447.3 9.3 331,591,710,742 
2012 8,229,490,030,100.00 6092.8 7.7 295,625,587,109 
2013 9,240,270,452,047.00 6807.4 7.7 347,848,740,397 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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Urbanization and Employment  
Figure 3 provides information about China’s rural and urban populations and 
employment rates. In 1980, only 19% Chinese lived in urban areas and the remaining 81% 
lived in rural areas. In 2013 after 33 years, the urban population increased to 53% and the 
remaining 47% still live in rural areas. Agricultural employment decreased 
correspondingly from 69% in 1980 to 35% in 2011.  The unemployment rates essentially 
remained around 4.4% from 1991 when data became available to 2013.  
  
Life Expectancy, Prenatal Care and Infant Mortality 
Table 2 provides information on life expectancy, prenatal care, and infant mortality.  Life 
expectancy for females increased from 69 in 1980 to 77 in 2012, an increase of 11.6% in 
32 years. Life expectancy for males increased from 66 in 1980 to 74 in 2012, an increase 
of 12.1%. Seventy percent of pregnant women received prenatal care in 1992. The 
percentage increased to 95 in 2012. Infant mortality rate was 48 per 1,000 live births in 
1980. The rate steadily decreased to 11 per 1,000 in 2013. 
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Figure 3. Agriculture Employment, Rural Population, Urban 
Population, and Unemployment (% of total population)
Source: World Bank
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Table 2. Life Expectancy, Prenatal Care and Infant Mortality 
year 
Life Expectancy 
at birth, female 
(years) 
Life Expectancy at 
birth, male (years) 
Pregnant 
women 
receiving 
prenatal care 
(%) 
Infant mortality 
rate (per 1,000 
live births) 
1980 69 66 
 
48 
1981 69 66 
 
46 
1982 69 66 
 
45 
1983 69 66 
 
43 
1984 70 67 
 
43 
1985 70 67 
 
42 
1986 70 67 
 
42 
1987 70 67 
 
42 
1988 71 68 
 
42 
1989 71 68 
 
42 
1990 71 68 
 
42 
1991 71 68 
 
42 
1992 71 68 70 41 
1993 72 68 73 40 
1994 72 69 76 39 
1995 72 69 79 38 
1996 72 69 84 36 
1997 73 69 86 35 
1998 73 70 87 34 
1999 73 70 89 32 
2000 74 71 89 30 
2001 74 71 90 28 
2002 74 72 90 26 
2003 75 72 89 24 
2004 75 73 90 22 
2005 75 73 90 20 
2006 76 73 90 19 
2007 76 73 91 17 
2008 76 73 91 16 
2009 76 73 92 15 
2010 76 74 94 14 
2011 76 74 94 13 
2012 77 74 95 12 
2013 
   
11 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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Poverty Rates and Distribution of Income  
The poverty rate was calculated with the threshold of $1.25 a day. In 1981, 84.3% lived 
below $1.25. The rate declined to 54% in 1987. However it climbed up to 60.7% in 1990, 
and then steadily dropped to 6.3% in 2011. The decrease of poverty population was 
drastic in the 30 years (Table 3). However, the distribution of income to the lowest 
quintile declined from 8.7% of the total income in 1981 to 4.7% of the total income, a 
sharp decline in share. The second lowest quintile received 13.5% of the national income 
in 1981 but the share decreased to 9.6% in 2008. The third quintile retained essentially 
the same share of slightly above 15%. The fourth quintile managed to retain over 22% of 
the total share of income until 2008. From 2010 the income shared by the fourth quintile 
declined to below 19%. The group that reaped the most income increase was the highest 
quintile. Their share of total income increased from 37.9% in 1981 to a high of 48.6% in 
2002 and declined very slightly in 2010. As GDP increased nearly 49 times from 1980 to 
2013, the highest quintile’s steadily increasing share of total income in such a rapidly 
growing economy indicates a rapid growth of gap between the rich and poor.  Poverty 
rates, however, have drastically declined during the same period of time, which may 
indicate a significant improvement in the quality of life in general.  This general 
improvement in the quality of life may improve the legitimacy of the government, but 
this improvement is potentially undermined by the rapidly enlarging gap between the rich 
and the poor.  This gap may offset the improvement of the legitimacy based on pure GDP 
growth. 
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Table 3. Poverty Rates and Distribution of Income among Five Quintiles 
Year 
Poverty at $1.25 
a day (PPP) (% 
of population) 
Lowest 
20% 
income 
shared 
Second 
lowest 
20% 
Third 
20% 
Fourth 
20% 
Highest 
20% 
1981 84.3 8.7 13.1 14.7 22.9 37.9 
1984 69.4 8.9 13.5 17.8 23.2 36.6 
1987 54 8 13.1 17.6 23.4 37.9 
1990 60.7 8 12.2 16.5 22.6 40.7 
1993 54.9 7.4 11.3 15.8 22.3 43.2 
1996 37.4 7.2 11.3 15.8 22.3 43.3 
1999 36 6.4 10.3 15 22.2 46.1 
2002 28.1 5.5 9.4 14.3 22.2 48.6 
2005 15.8 5 9.9 15 22.2 47.9 
2008 12.3 4.8 9.6 15 22.7 47.9 
2010 9.2 4.7 9.7 15.3 18.7 47.1 
2011 6.3    19.2  
2012     19.7  
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Domestic Perceptions of the CCP and Its Political Legitimacy 
 China is realizing its modernization dreams in terms of economic development. 
The rapid GDP growth, urbanization, increasing health care expenditure, decline of 
poverty, increasing life expectancy, prenatal care, and decreasing infant mortality rate 
should point to improvement of Chinese government’s legitimacy. However, the rapidly 
growing gap between the rich and the poor may make people question the very nature of 
the Communist Party. Does the Communist Party fight for the working people as it 
traditionally claims? What does the enlarging gap between the rich and poor tell about the 
Party? Questions such as these may cast doubts over the slogans generated by the system.  
 Table 4 presents the online survey conducted by People’s Tribune, an online 
version of the magazine affiliated to the most important official newspaper in China, The 
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People’s Daily. The information was copied from the ongoing survey which was being 
updated with incoming responses daily in April, 2013. In other words, the information in 
Table 4 does not represent the final result of the survey. It was captured while the survey 
was still going on. The uncompleted survey is used, because the author of this paper did 
not have access to the final result, which may have been published online but soon 
removed.  
 To the question “Do you agree that the CCP has sufficient courage and wisdom to 
speed up reform?” only 7.41% respondents selected “Strongly agree.” Another 5.88% 
agreed. That makes a mere 13.29% of the respondents that made a positive answer. With 
the 13.25% who chose “Don’t know,” there was a high of 73.45% of the respondents that 
selected “Disagree.” Responses to the next three questions display the same tendency 
with an overwhelming proportion of respondents who selected “Disagree.” 
 To the question “Do you agree with the statement that "sticking to the 
development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is beneficial to the fundamental 
interests of the broadest masses of people?” only 5.25% answered “Strongly Agree.” 
Another 4.51% selected “Agree.” That makes a combined less than 10% of the sample 
who believed that the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is beneficial 
to the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of people. The overwhelming 81.26% 
of those surveyed disagreed with the statement. 
 Furthermore, slightly fewer than 9% of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed 
that “it is only the CCP that is able to lead the people well down the route of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics”.  This data is complicated by the inability to discern if the 
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people disagreed with the CCP’s competence, the CCP’s rhetoric, or both.  Regardless, 
this question suggests that the CCP’s competence and the CCP’s rhetoric may be at odds 
with what the Chinese people see as beneficial.   
 Finally, 12.34% of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the system of 
“ruled by one party (the CCP) and participated by many practiced in China.  This data 
suggests that further political reform is in order that would better solidify the legitimacy 
of the CCP.  Overwhelmingly, the data suggests discontentment with the political system 
and the CCP’s official rhetoric.  In effect, this discontentment demonstrates the insecurity 
of de facto authority.   
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Table 4. People’s Tribune Survey of Confidence, Conviction and Faith, 2013 
Question Response Frequency Percentage 
Do you agree that the CCP has sufficient 
courage and wisdom to speed up reform? 
Strongly 
Agree 
170 7.41 
Agree 135 5.88 
Don’t Know 304 13.25 
Disagree 1685 73.45 
Total 2,294 100.00 
Do you agree with the statement that 
"sticking to the development of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics is 
beneficial to the fundamental interests of 
the broadest masses of people"? 
Strongly 
Agree 
120 5.25 
Agree 103 4.51 
Don’t Know 207 9.06 
Disagree 1856 81.26 
Total 2,286 100.00 
Do you agree with the statement that "it 
is only the CCP that is able to lead the 
people well down the route of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics"? 
Strongly 
Agree 
130 4.80 
Agree 96 4.18 
Don’t Know 194 8.46 
Disagree 1094 82.56 
Total 2,294 100.00 
How do you take on the system of "ruled 
by one party (CCP) and participated by 
many" practiced in China? 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
159 6.93 
Agree 124 5.41 
Don’t Know 177 7.72 
Disagree 1833 79.94 
Total 2,293 100.00 
Source: The People’s Tribune. http://www.rmlt.com.cn/ 
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Discussion 
China’s economic achievement in the last three decades has been breathtaking. As 
data from the World Bank indicate, GDP grew nearly 50 times in the last three decades or 
so. The statistics display remarkable improvement in the areas of poverty, health care, 
prenatal care, infant mortality and life expectancy. Based on the traditional understanding 
of the Mandate of Heaven, the Chinese government should enjoy wide support from the 
people. Nonetheless, the Chinese official online People’s Tribune survey showed the 
contrary. An overwhelming majority did not believe that the official rhetoric of “sticking 
to the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics was beneficial to the 
fundamental interest of the broadest masses of the people.” This attitude may be related 
to the distribution of the results of the economic growth.  
Although the standard of living substantially improved for all groups, including 
the poor, the top quintile received the largest share of total income. On the other hand, the 
income share of the lowest quintile has continually declined. A large part of the 
population may have escaped or are escaping absolute poverty, but they may be headed 
into the great pressure that comes with looming relative poverty. It would be difficult for 
these people to be fully convinced of the benefit the overall socio-economic changes of 
the society have brought to them.  This perception of relative poverty is further 
exacerbated by the CCP’s tendency to favor ‘quasi-monopolies,’ which were created and 
protected by the state; they have contributed remarkably to China’s on-going economic 
development (Wallerstein, 2000).  The re-investment of wealth into the quasi-monopolies 
explains, in part, the significant growth in the wealthiest quintile’s share of the country’s 
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economic rewards.  The quasi-monopolies also explain discontentment with the 
distribution of wealth as a form of relative poverty rather than absolute poverty.   
The overwhelming majority of those surveyed did not believe that “it is only the 
CCP that is able to lead the people well down the route of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.” If the people are not convinced of the benefit the economic development 
has brought to them, it is difficult for them to support the system wholeheartedly. Besides, 
the Chinese characteristics remain poorly defined. If respondents were suspicious of the 
rhetoric of socialism with Chinese characteristics, they might have given the CCP low 
scores because they rejected the concept itself rather than whether they thought it was 
CCP or any other political party that would be able to lead the country properly. 
The lack of belief in the official rhetoric of socialism with Chinese characteristics 
is also reflected in, if not explained by, the response to the question “How do you take on 
the system of ‘ruled by one party (CCP) and participated by many’ practiced in China?” 
There seems to be a deep suspicion among Chinese people over the one-party political 
system. The Chinese government set up by the Communists in 1949 has been a de facto 
authority that came as a result of the military victory over the Nationalists. The Mandate 
of Heaven, or the presumably assumed level of political legitimacy, was waiting to be 
confirmed by the expected consequence that the people were prospering (Nuyen, 2013).  
Although Mao Zedong almost squandered the Mandate of Heaven, the system did not 
become obsolete automatically, because the Communists’ military victory did not bring 
about a mechanism that peacefully transferred power as Western democracies do. It 
would take political reform to bring China a mechanism for a smooth power transfer.  
The evidence that the overwhelming majority of the online survey participants did not 
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believe that “the CCP had sufficient courage and wisdom to speed up reform” reflects the 
fact that there have been too few tangible commencing efforts toward political reform. 
On the other hand, it may also indicate that the general public in China may not be well 
informed about what is going on about political reform in the country.  Tangibility seems 
to be the key for the Chinese people to perceive success in the CCP’s political reform 
initiatives.   
In fact, China has been building and has been increasingly practicing a “rule-
based order.” Rudd (2014) claims that through constructing modernization as the 
facilitator of happiness, the government has the capacity to continue the “rules-based 
order” that has facilitated thirty years of rapid economic growth despite the rapid societal 
transformations and conflicts that characterize modernization.  In effect, modernization as 
a priority for the government has been legitimized through laws designed to address 
human rights issues.   Regardless of the perceptions of the CCP, China has legitimized 
modernization as the top legal priority.  Through this process, China has developed a 
political structure that is intended to protect modernization efforts while addressing 
international calls for democratization.  For example, the government typically allows for 
the communication of information between the government and the populace, but the 
government restricts the free-flow of communication if the communication threatens 
modernization efforts (Zhao, 2010).  Furthermore, the focus upon rules-based order 
clarifies the roles of individual Chinese citizens in society.  In doing so, political 
decisions and discourse have become arguably more participatory and more structured.  
There have been recent efforts to democratize intra-party relations (Zhao, 2010).  
Additionally, the party has bureaucratized towards a model of formal institutional 
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authority from a model of cults of personality while promoting transparency and 
supervision within the party.  Finally, the party has introduced “piecemeal and gradual 
reform” in carefully selected, non-controversial areas (Zhao, 2010, p.429). This level of 
bureaucracy and impersonality further strengthens the government’s claims that it is on 
the path towards democratization.   
In all of these initiatives, the Chinese government has more or less abandoned its 
position as the party for the workers, and has replaced this foundation with the belief that 
the party can be all things to all people (Zhao, 2010).  The results of the survey, though, 
indicate that the Chinese people may not realize the extent to which the CCP is becoming 
more rationalized and bureaucratic.  As such, the CCP will need to develop a transparent 
narrative that explains the connection between economic development and social 
modernization; this narrative must also explain why the perception of relative poverty is 
excusable based on the other benefits of modernization.  The step towards a 
comprehensive and transparent narrative may function to cover the gap between de facto 
legitimacy and the Mandate of Heaven specifically by explaining why modernization is 
in the best interest of China’s populace. 
Conclusion 
 Modernization in China is a very complex process that entails rapid societal 
change in multiple areas of social life.  China has made huge strides in modernizing its 
economy and society.  China’s experiences of the Four Modernizations have been highly 
successful and are unprecedented in the world’s modernization history.  The economic 
and social gains achieved through this dedication to modernization are remarkable and 
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incomparable to any other country’s experiences of modernization.  Government plays a 
crucial role in this process.  In order to justify modernization as a worth-while pursuit, the 
Chinese government is still faced with various daunting challenges. The rapidly growing 
inequality in China poses a threat to political legitimacy. This would not be a threat in a 
democracy, but it is in China, where the government is not elected and where it must 
provide for the prosperity of its people in order to justify its legitimacy. The government 
needs to strike a difficult balance between improving the standard of living for the poor 
and providing incentives for the rich to contribute to the economy.   
The Chinese government needs to speed up political reform not only to fix the 
imbalance between the economic and political aspects of the modernization process, but 
also to break the spell of its lack of legitimacy if it fails to bring about fairly distributed 
prosperity.  Most importantly, the Chinese Communist Party suffers from domestic 
perceptions of its incompetency to lead in further reform, not because of the country’s 
economic performance, but because of the lack of progress in political reform.  
The Chinese Communist Party’s precarious legitimacy is also related to the 
perception that it stands opposite to the Western conception of democracy which has 
become a dominant global ideology (Torfason and Ingram, 2010). According to Rudd 
(2014), China and the United States should develop public narratives about each other to 
improve trust.  The narratives should cover various issues including world order, security, 
prosperity and human rights.  The creation of this common narrative in international 
relations would stabilize the legitimacy of the Chinese government on an international 
level.  If the Chinese government explains modernization as a vehicle towards political 
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reform, then it is essential that other countries do not see China’s modernization as a 
threat to the international world order. 
One limitation of this study is that it uses aggregate data drawn from different 
sources that does not permit statistical analysis.  Statistical analysis would provide direct 
support or lack thereof to the arguments. In other words, the arguments of this paper 
should be perceived as tentative, because they are based on inferences from the data and 
limited by leaps in the inferences.  Future studies may need to collect or utilize 
comprehensive data that warrant rigorous statistical analysis and more confident 
conclusions. 
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